By D. M. Armstrong
This can be a research, in volumes, of 1 of the longest-standing philosophical difficulties: the matter of universals. In quantity I David Armstrong surveys and criticizes the most techniques and ideas to the issues which were canvassed, rejecting some of the varieties of nominalism and 'Platonic' realism. In quantity II he develops a huge concept of his personal, an target idea of universals established no longer on linguistic conventions, yet at the real and power findings of average technology. He therefore reconciles a realism approximately characteristics and kin with an empiricist epistemology. the idea permits, too, for a powerful rationalization of ordinary legislation as family among those universals.
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Additional resources for A Theory of Universals: Volume 2: Universals and Scientific Realism (v. 2)
The problem with such a claim, however, is that “father of Solomon,” even if it is a genuine accident of David, is simply not an accident of Solomon. I do not see how it can be, let alone how that would result from its being an accident of David. And the point about Solomon being contained in the accident as one of its constituents does not help either. Suppose that Solomon is contained in the accident. His relationship to that accident is something like that of part to whole. That he is such a constituent of “father of Solomon” surely does not mean that “father of Solomon” is an accident of his.
Now, I agree that the sentence does imply that purely extrinsic denominations are denominations which lack a foundation in the denominated thing. However, once a correct understanding of “foundation” is acquired, the sentence becomes a proof text for my reading of NPE. A denomination that has no foundation in the denominated thing is one that is not included in the denominated thing. And why can there not be any of those? ” NPE, when read as (6), is precisely the claim that there are no extrinsic denominations that are not included in what they denominate.
First, it does not really make any sense as a reading of the passage Truth and Purely Extrinsic Denominations 31 just quoted. If that is what Leibniz meant, then why does he say “and in the case of both an intrinsic and an extrinsic denomination,” as though both were in the denominated thing in the same way? Secondly, as we have seen, intrinsic denominations cannot furnish an a priori proof for propositions whose predicates are extrinsic denominations. I believe Leibniz understood the implications of his own doctrine of truth and its connections to his notions of a priori proof and the reason for a proposition.
A Theory of Universals: Volume 2: Universals and Scientific Realism (v. 2) by D. M. Armstrong